Water supply infrastructure in the United States is one lifeline system that is in dire need of huge financial investments to counter pipeline deterioration while keeping up with increasing demands and reliability goals. With decreasing financial resources available to state and local governments, effective decision-making tools for pipeline prioritization are becoming an increasingly integral part of the water utility industry. A majority of existing prioritization frameworks are merely based on the likelihood of the failure of pipelines and the resulting consequences, with little consideration given to the utility's response time to a water pipeline failure. This paper presents a novel resilience-based framework for effective prioritization of water distribution pipelines. The novelty lies in estimating the utility's response time to a pipeline failure. The proposed framework is demonstrated on a section of a real water distribution network in a coastal city of the United States. The pipeline priority results obtained are also compared with those from a more traditional risk-based prioritization scheme, and a reasonably significant difference has been observed. While availability of quality data is a challenge, this study brings to attention the importance of response time to water pipeline failures and demonstrates the merits of incorporating it in a prioritization scheme.
INTRODUCTION
There is a great dependability of modern urban societies on lifeline systems such as drinking water distribution networks (WDNs) for basic survival and economic prosperity. Therefore, reliability of supply both in terms of quantity and quality is one of the top priorities for any water utility.
Supply interruptions could also impede firefighting capabilities, potentially resulting in loss of lives and property. The American Society for Civil Engineers (ASCE) in their latest infrastructure report card gave a near-failing 'D' grade for drinking water infrastructure (ASCE ). Our WDNs, currently in a deteriorated state, need huge investments that are beyond the capabilities of local municipalities and governments. For example, the estimated 20-year capital investment need for revamping deteriorated pipelines in the United States is about $334.8 billion (ASCE ). This poor state can be primarily attributed to the fact that a majority of pipelines have been in service for considerably longer than their intended use. Sub-optimal design techniques at the time of their installation combined with lack of adequate maintenance exacerbated this problem.
Due to the lack of economically feasible and reliable condition assessment techniques, a majority of pipelines are not adequately monitored in order to identify and fix the defects before they grow into catastrophic failures. With about 240,000 water main breaks reported annually in the USA, consequences of the current state of WDNs include decreased reliability, supply interruptions, and other societal inconveniences (ASCE ). These consequences could be prohibitively expensive, depending primarily on the size of the failed pipeline and its importance in the overall WDN functioning. For example, emergency repairs to large diameter water mains in critical locations have proven to be expensive compared to planned rehabilitation (ASCE ).
Consequently, effective asset management and subsequent prioritization of critical pipelines for planned rehabilitation is a timely need for water utilities. This paper presents a novel prioritization framework for rehabilitation of critical pipelines. The novelty lies in the modeling of time taken to detect and repair failed pipelines. The proposed framework is demonstrated on a section of real WDN to highlight its advantages compared to the more traditional risk-based framework for rehabilitation prioritization. . Failure criticality in a majority of these past studies was evaluated based on the respective pipeline's condition and the estimated impact of its failure. As water pipelines age, they deteriorate due to the combination of several factors that include natural material degradation and subsequent loss of structural integrity, lack of proper maintenance, fatigue loading and subsequent localized damage, design defects or construction errors that weaken the system over time, adverse operating schedules, and adverse environments (Piratla et al. ) .
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Pipeline condition upon investigation is usually translated into the probability of its failure. Impacts of water pipeline failures in some cases are felt only locally in the form of flooding of streets, damage to roads and traffic restrictions, and in other cases are system-wide in the form of supply interruptions, low pressures, and potential contamination.
The aggregate failure impacts are usually represented using a normalized index. Approaches adopted in the literature for estimating failure probability and failure impacts are briefly reviewed in the following paragraphs.
Previous researchers employed different approaches for estimating the failure probability of water supply pipelines.
Moglia et al. () used a non-homogeneous Poisson process
(NHPP) model by considering pipe length, size, type, age, operating pressure, and soil type as influential variables, and also modified this using the best linear unbiased predictor for better failure probability prediction. Rogers & Grigg () used NHPP and multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) for estimating pipeline failure probability. Rogers & Grigg's () NHPP model is based on pipe age, condition, and historical failure information, and was found to be applicable only to pipelines with three or more previous breaks. The MCDA model is based on the ratings given to several influential factors along with their respective user-assigned weights, and it was found to be applicable to pipelines with one or two previous breaks. Studzinski & Pietrucha-Urbanik () estimated failure probability based on the ratio of average pipeline suspension time due to repair to the average operational time without a failure. Grigg et al. () calculated the pipeline failure likelihood index using the weighted sum of ratings given to variables such as age, break rate, and service conditions (i.e., traffic load, pressure zone, and soil corrosivity), where weights are defined by the user. Rahman et al. () proposed a probability failure score based on the remaining useful life of a pipeline, which is estimated by considering age, material, and failure history. Yoo et al. () estimated failure probability using a probabilistic neural network (PNN) model based on pipeline deterioration rate, which was calculated by considering internal and external factors that influence pipeline failure. Internal factors included several pipeline attributes, failure history, failure type, water quality, and operating pressure. External factors included corrosion rate, backfilled soil type, and road width. In addition to the studies reviewed in this paper, there are several other published studies that evaluated failure probability of pipelines; however, a major limitation has been the availability of quality data that enhances the accuracy of the model output. In summary, several studies in the past developed riskbased prioritization models for WDNs; however, many limitations led to over-simplification of risk calculations, especially while estimating the consequences. Not much consideration has been given to estimating the time taken by a water utility operator in responding to a pipeline failure.
Clearly, failure consequences depend on how fast and efficiently a water utility operator responds. This paper proposes and demonstrates a modified risk assessment model, named as resilience assessment, which is based on pipeline failure probability, consequences, and restoration capability, which are separately estimated and integrated into one metric.
RESILIENCE-BASED PRIORITIZATION FRAMEWORK
Resilience has been defined in the literature in different ways: Woods (, ) defined it as the capability of a system to create foresight, to recognize, to anticipate, and to defend against the changing shape of risk before adverse consequences occur. Rose & Liao () defined it as the inherent ability and adaptive responses of systems that enable them to avoid potential losses; O'Rourke () defined it as the ability of a system to bounce or spring back into shape or position after being pressed or stretched.
In this study, resilience in the context of WDNs is defined as the ability to resist failure and recover within minimum possible cost and time consequences. This definition is further explained using the life cycle illustration of a water main break presented in Figure 1 .
The ability to resist failure without loss of functionality is a combined effect of the inherent system strength and the type and extent of stresses imposed upon it. For example, deterioration due to wall corrosion in metallic pipelines will degrade the structural capacity to perform under a variety of loads. Consequently, the failure probability will be higher in such pipelines, making them less resilient to failures. This ability to resist failures is expected to decrease with increased deterioration, which is a currently prevailing trend in the USA's WDN pipelines. As illustrated in Figure 1 , if a pipeline fails at time 'T F ' due to its reduced ability to resist failures, overall system performance drops from its original performance (C O ) to performance in failed state (C F ). The extent of performance reduction (C O -C F ) depends on the failure severity, the overall WDN's reliance on the failed pipeline, and the amount of redundancy available in the system. Once a failure is detected, the corresponding pipeline will be isolated at time 'T D ' for repair. At this time, the overall system performance changes from C F to C D , where C D denotes WDN performance when the failed pipe is isolated for repair. Emergency crews are sent to repair the pipeline, after which full functionality (C O ) is recovered at time 'T R .' The loss in WDN resilience for a given pipeline failure can be characterized by the hashed area in Figure 1 , which is approximately equal to
In asset management, pipelines are monitored for their physical condition in order to evaluate probability of failure or expected remaining service life. Given the failure probability of a pipeline (P j ), the WDN resilience against that specific pipeline's failure (R j ) is calculated using Equation
(1). A logarithmic function is proposed to quantify resilience in order to constrain its value between 0 and 1. The overall WDN resilience (R) is calculated using Equations (2)- (4).
where R j is the WDN resilience against failure of pipeline j; P j is the failure probability of pipeline j; C O is the original WDN performance before failure; C F is the WDN performance immediately after the failure of pipeline j; C D is the WDN performance when a failed pipeline is detected and isolated; T F is the time of occurrence of failure; T D is the time when a failed pipeline is detected and isolated; T R is the time when a failed pipeline is repaired and re-commissioned into service; R is the overall WDN resilience; W j is the relative importance of pipeline j in the WDN; NS is the number of pipelines in the WDN; C' j is the effect on WDN performance when pipeline j is isolated; Qr i is the required flow at node i of WDN; Q i,j is the actual flow supplied at node i when pipeline j is removed from the WDN;
and NN is the total number of nodes in the WDN. . The limitation of these models, however, is that they require high quality data, which may not be always available. Failure probability of a pipeline (P j ) is estimated in this study using a more tried and tested approach, presented in Equation (5) (Ciaponi et al. ) :
where P j is the probability that only pipeline j will fail; p(a) j is the probability that pipeline j is available and functional; and NS is the number of pipelines in the WDN.
Pipeline availability, p(a) j , is 1 minus the failure probability, as shown in Equation (6). Failure probability of a pipeline is estimated using Equation (7) assuming that the failure rate follows a Poisson distribution (Yoo et al. ) :
where p(f) is the pipeline failure probability; γ is the prevailing break rate in number of failures/year/feet, which is estimated using historic failure data; and L is the pipeline length in feet (1 foot ¼ 0.3048 m).
Failure consequences
Failure consequences are the losses incurred as a result of water pipeline failure. Depending on topology, design, redundancy, and demand patterns, failure consequences vary across a WDN. Consequences can be categorized into 'local impacts' and 'system-wide impacts.' Failure consequences of a large diameter pipeline that forms a critical link to a section of WDN could have system-wide impacts, rendering a significant portion of WDN dysfunctional. On the other hand, there will be some pipelines where failure will result in mere local impacts. System-wide consequences can be quantified by estimating the shortage of supply at all demand nodes in the WDN for a pipeline failure scenario.
Consequences in the following two sequential stages of pipeline failure are separately estimated in this study: (a) from failure occurrence until the pipeline is isolated for repair (i.
e., C O -C F in Figure 1 ) and (b) from pipeline isolation until it is repaired and re-commissioned (i.e., C O -C D in Figure 1 ).
Failure consequence in the first sequential stage is the reduction in system pressure due to energy loss from the failure. Only after the problem is detected and located is the pipeline isolated for repair by closing the isolation valves nearest to either side of the failure location.
In order to assess the failure consequence in this first stage (C j ), orifice flows at the center of pipelines are simulated in this study. Discharge through orifice nodes, calculated using
Greely's formula shown in Equation (8), are used to estimate the resulting steady-state pressure heads at all the WDN nodes through integration of EPANET with the pressuredriven simulation model that is characterized by Equations (9)- (11) (Gupta & Bhave ) . This integration is accomplished through the use of EPANET toolkit (Rossman ) in visual basic for applications interface of Microsoft Excel.
The actual nodal flows in failed state (Q i,j ) are estimated using the following iterative steps: (1) nodal heads (H act ) are estimated using EPANET; (2) actual nodal demands (Q) are calculated based on the estimated H act using Equations (9)-(11); (3) adjusted H act is calculated for each node based on the calculated nodal demand (Q) using EPANET; and (4) convergence of H act is checked and steps 2 and 3 are repeated until ΔH act is negligibly small. Failure consequences from the resulting WDN node heads are calculated using Equation (12).
where Q 0 is the orifice flow rate in gpm; A is the cross-sectional area of the break in square inches (1 inch ¼ 25.4 mm), which is considered to be the same as the pipeline's cross-sectional area; and H is the node pressure in psi.
where Q i,j is the actual flow supplied at node i when pipeline j has failed; Qr i is the required flow at node i of the H i des and DSR can be calculated using Equations (10) and (11) 
where K i is an empirical resistance factor for node i, taken in this study as 0.1 min 2 /m 5 for all nodes; and n is an exponent which is taken as 2 in this study (Gupta & Bhave ) .
where C j is the estimated failure consequence of pipeline j before it is isolated; and NN is the total number of nodes in the WDN. It should be noted that C j is a metric that ranges between 0 and 1, and represents C O -C F in Figure 1 .
Consequences of water pipeline failure in the second sequential stage include possible system-wide pressure reduction and supply outages. These consequences (C' j ) are estimated following the same procedure described for C j using Equation (4) In fact, the detection (TD) and repair (TR) times of failed pipelines depend on several factors that are identified in Table 1 .
As seen in Figure 3 , repair time (TR) is considered to be dependent on several factors, such as pipeline diameter (R 1 ), pipeline material (R 2 ), type of soil (R 3 ), presence of surrounding utilities (R 4 ), ground water table (R 5 ), working space (R 6 ), reachability of the work site (R 7 ), and labor skills (R 8 ). Larger diameter pipelines are expected to take a longer time for repair than smaller diameter pipelines (Hartley ). R 1 is classified into three categories and ratings assigned accordingly, as shown in Table 2 . Concrete pipes were reported to have taken more time for repair followed by metal pipes and then plastic pipes (Bueno ); rating criteria R 2 factor is accordingly formulated and presented in Table 2 . Rating criteria for R 3 , R 5 , R 7 , and R 8 factors are appropriately formulated based on evidence from the literature (Doloi et al. ; Weir & Cullen ), whereas rating criteria for R 4 and R 6 are intuitively formulated, as shown in Table 2 .
Once all the factors that affect TD and TR of water pipe- (13) and (14): 
where RD 1i and RD 2k are ratings (i.e., 0.1, 0.55, or 1) given to factors that influence TD; RR m is a rating given to factors that influence TR; WD and WR are weightings of TD and TR, respectively, as shown in Figure 4 ; WD 1, WD 2 , WD 1i , and WD 2k are weightings of D 1 , D 2 , D 1i , and D 2k factors as shown in Figure 4 ; WR m is a weighting of the R m factor as shown in Figure 4 .
Resilience-based prioritization
In order to rehabilitate pipelines, it is important to accurately prioritize them based on their criticality. In this paper, a resilience-based prioritization scheme is proposed in which criticality is assessed based on WDN resilience to each pipeline failing (R j ). R j is calculated using Equation (15), which is a reformed version of Equation (1). Failure probability, consequences, and response time parameters used in Equation (15) are estimated using the formulations presented in the preceding paragraphs in this section: (15) where R j is the WDN resilience against failure of pipeline j; P j is the failure probability of pipeline j; C j is an estimated failure consequence of a pipeline before it is isolated for repair; C' j is the estimated failure consequence of a pipeline after it is isolated for repair; TD j is an indicator of the failure detection time of pipeline j; and TR j is an indicator of the estimated repair time of pipeline j.
DEMONSTRATION OF THE PRIORITIZATION FRAMEWORK
The proposed resilience-based prioritization framework is demonstrated in this study using a slightly modified section of a large WDN that serves a coastal city in the USA. The WDN section used for demonstration, hereafter referred to as CWDN, consists of 53 nodes and 72 pipelines with lengths ranging from 25 feet to 800 feet. The physical pipeline layout of CWDN was obtained in geographic information system (GIS) format from the public water utility that manages water supply in the region. Appropriate boundary conditions for CWDN are modeled by adding one pump connected to a reservoir, as shown in Figure 5 . Figures 6-8 illustrate the distribution of pipe material, diameter, and soil type measured by length of CWDN pipelines, respectively. P j is calculated using Equation (5) based on records of previous failures in CWDN, which are summarized in Table 3 . A representative hydraulic model is developed for CWDN using EPANET, which is later integrated with the pressure-demand relationships characterized in Equations (9)- (11), for simulating failed states in order to assess the consequences (C j and C' j ) as per Equations (4) and TR, R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 are rated, as per Table 2 , based on available GIS data for CWDN. Ratings for D 11 , D 12 , and D 21 are considered to be dependent on pipe sizes, an assumption that is consistent with most common asset management practices. Pipes less than 24 inches in diameter are considered to be 'passively' monitored using 'visual' techniques for failure detection and location. Pipes with a diameter greater than 24 inches are considered to be 'periodically' monitored using ad hoc techniques for failure detection and location. R 5 was given a rating of 0.1 for all pipelines, as per Table 2, because the ground water level in the CWDN region is in the range of 5 to 15 feet (Walter ) and the typical soil cover depth for CWDN pipelines is only about 4 feet. R 6 and R 7 factors are rated, as per Table 2 , based on road types and distances of respective pipelines from the water utility office location.
Due to the lack of available data, ratings for the remaining three factors, namely, D 22 , R 4 , and R 8 , are simulated using the Monte Carlo technique. One hundred simulations were carried out using random ratings for these three factors (i.e., D 22 , R 4 , and R 8 ) and estimated ratings for the other nine factors are discussed in the preceding paragraph. The resultant TD j and TR j are combined with P j , C j , and C' j of the respective CWDN pipelines using Equation (15) to obtain resilience values (R j ) and subsequent priority rankings. The pipeline corresponding to the least CWDN resilience is given the highest priority for rehabilitation.
The calculated resilience of CWDN against singular failures of its pipelines varied from 0.76 to 0.86 over the 100 simulations. It turned out that the pipeline corresponding to the least resilience value has the highest values of estimated consequences (C j and C' j ) and repair time (TR j ).
The highest consequence is because the least resilient pipeline is a water main of 24-inch diameter. The highest repair time is due to the fact that this large diameter pipeline is buried within the freeway right-of-way, making it take a longer time to repair. Additionally, three specific pipelines stood out with significantly lower resilience values compared to others, which is mainly due to their higher failure consequences (C j and C j ') and repair time (TR). These initial observations suggested that failure consequences may have greatly influenced resilience values. In order to evaluate the overall correlation between the individual parameters (i.e., P j , C j , C' j , TD j , and TR j ) and resilience (R j ), a pairwise comparison metric h(R, E) is formulated, as shown in
Equations (16)- (19), and used.
h R, E ð Þ¼
where R i,j is the pair-wise comparison of CWDN resilience against failures of pipelines i and j; E i,j is the pair-wise comparison of different parameters (i.e., 'E' can be P j , C j , C' j , TD j , or TR j ) for pipelines i and j; g(R i,j , E i,j ) is a metric indicating the change in pair-wise comparison of pipelines i and j between resilience and any of the other parameters; h(R, E) is the percent change in pair-wise comparisons over all possible pairs of pipelines (i, j); l is the number of pipelines in the network.
The calculated h(R, E) for all possible combinations of resilience and other parameters is illustrated in Figure 9 . It can be seen from Figure 9 that resilience had the greatest correlation with P j , with only about 9% change in pairwise pipeline priorities, followed by TR with about 42% change. Upon further investigation, it was observed that higher correlation between R j , and P j is mainly due to the fact that several of the CWDN pipelines are smaller in diameter, which hints that their failure probability is greater and repair times shorter. The smaller variances of repair times are not sufficient to change the pair-wise priorities formed on the basis of failure probability. On the other hand, detection time can be seen to have the least correlation with resilience, as per Figure 9 , which is due to its smaller variance across CWDN pipelines. The failure consequence post-isolation (C') was found to be negligible for 62 pipelines among the total of 72, because the actual node flow was close or equal to the required flow and as a result, h(R, C') was found to be close to zero.
The overall CWDN resilience calculated using Equation analysis. In a risk-based approach, pipelines are prioritized based on failure risk calculated using Equation (20).
where P j is the failure probability of pipeline j; and C' j is the consequence of pipeline failure post its isolation for repair.
Calculation procedures of P j and C' j are discussed in the section 'Resilience-based prioritization framework'.
For each of the 100 simulations performed for estimating TD and TR, CWDN pipelines are prioritized in the increasing order of system resilience against respective pipeline failures, resulting in 100 sets of priority rankings.
CWDN pipelines are also prioritized using the risk-based approach based on Equation (20) to obtain one set of priority rankings. The 100 sets of priorities from the resilience-based approach are compared with priorities from the risk-based approach by employing the percent change metric h (R, R'), calculated using Equations (16)-(19).
The overall percent change is in the range of 7.9 to 10.4%, with an average of about 9.2% over the 100 simulations.
The observed percent change in pair-wise priorities from risk to resilience-based methods is, for the most part, due Similarly, 98.6, 100, 100, and 100% of CWDN pipelines fall in the 'metal' -(R 2 ), 'sandy facies' -(R 3 ), 'above ground water table' -(R 5 ), and 'less than one mile from water utility location' -(R 7 ) categories, respectively (1 mile ¼ 1.609 km).
CWDN is a small 72-pipeline section considered for demonstrating the proposed approach in this study, and it definitely lacks the kind of variation in pipe material, soil type, and accessibility that is usually observed in a typical large-scale WDN. Clearly, the percent change, h (R, R'), would have been greater in a large-scale WDN, thereby highlighting the greater significance of incorporating response time into prioritization schemes.
It is also suggested in this study that WDN resilience can be enhanced by not only improving the physical infrastructure but also the ability of a utility operator to respond quickly to a failed pipeline. The cost-benefit analyses of such improvements should be investigated in the future using a robust optimization algorithm. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

